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The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee
Program: A Systemwide Systemic Risk
Exception*
Lee Davison * *
Abstract
In the fall of 2008, short-term credit markets were all but frozen, creating
liquidity issues for banks and bank holding companies that could not
rollover their debt at reasonable rates. Fearing that the situation would
worsen if something was not done, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve Board invoked, and the
Secretary of the Treasury approved, the use of the “systemic risk
exception” (SRE) under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991, to provide unprecedented broad-based relief
to struggling banks. The SRE permitted the FDIC to depart from its “leastcost” requirement when addressing failing banks. Under the auspices of
the SRE, the FDIC implemented two programs: (1) the Debt Guarantee
Program (DGP), which extended the FDIC’s guarantee to newly issued
debt instruments of FDIC-insured institutions, their holding companies,
and their eligible affiliates; and (2) the Transaction Account Guarantee
Program (TAGP), which provided unlimited deposit insurance coverage
of non-interest-bearing transaction accounts. The DGP and TAGP were
integral parts of a broad government response to systemic risk in the
banking system and are considered successful elements thereof. Under
the DGP, at peak usage, the FDIC guaranteed approximately $350 billion
in newly issued bank debt. Under the TAGP, at peak usage, the FDIC
guaranteed approximately $800 billion in non-interest-bearing
transaction accounts at participating banks, offering for the first-time
insurance over the statutory amount. The fees collected for the programs
exceeded any losses covered by the government.
This article originally appeared as Chapter 2 in Crisis and Response: An FDIC History,
2008-2013, 33-65; we have retained the footnotes and bibliography as originally
formatted. Crisis and Response examines in detail the causes of the financial crisis, the
particular impacts on banks and their related entities, and the FDIC’s unprecedented and
multifaceted response during which it implemented new and innovative solutions. The
complete volume is available without charge from the FDIC’s website at
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/crisis/.
** Historian, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. This article does not necessarily
reflect the views of the FDIC.
*
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Introduction
During the unprecedented financial-market disruptions in the United
States and abroad in the fall of 2008, government officials took
extraordinary measures to calm market fears and encourage lending.
One of these measures was the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s
(FDIC) Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP). The TLGP had
two components. It provided a limited-term guarantee for certain newly
issued debt not only of banks and thrifts but also of bank, thrift, and
financial holding companies and eligible bank affiliates (the Debt
Guarantee Program, or DGP). Additionally, the TLGP fully guaranteed
certain non-interest-bearing transaction deposit accounts (the
Transaction Account Guarantee Program, or TAGP).
During the first half of October 2008, U.S. policymakers made the
decision to implement these programs and achieved consensus both
about the mechanism for creating them and about the policy trade-offs
involved in their design. During this same short period, the FDIC worked
to ensure that the two voluntary programs would be in place at the time
of their announcement on October 14, and during the last months of
2008, the FDIC refined the programs to increase their effectiveness.
Of the approximately 14,000 entities eligible to participate in the DGP,
about half opted into the program (though almost all the debt
guaranteed was issued by fewer than 50 such entities), and a significant
majority of eligible institutions signed on to the TAGP. At their height, the
DGP guaranteed almost $350 billion in outstanding debt and the TAGP
covered over $800 billion in deposits. The programs were designed in
such a way that expected fees would cover potential losses, but as it
turned out, the fees charged to participating entities far outstripped the
losses attributable to the TLGP as awhole.1 The DGP ended on October 31,
2009, a year after its introduction (though guaranteed debt remained
outstanding until 2012). The TAGP, after two extensions, ended on
December 31, 2010. The TLGP proved effective in stabilizing financial
markets, with the DGP reopening frozen debt markets to participating
entities and the TAGP stabilizing deposit funding for insured depository
institutions.

If the TLGP’s fees had been insufficient to cover losses, a systemic risk assessment
would have been levied on all insured institutions (see the section below titled “The
TLGP: Effects and Costs”).
1
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The Policy Debate in October 2008
With financial markets in turmoil, governments around the world sought
to formulate and coordinate responses designed to return stability to
those markets. In the United States and many other countries, the
responses involved guaranteeing debt issued by banks and expanding
deposit insurance coverage. In the United States, these two courses of
action occasioned a policy debate among financial regulators, leading to
the decision to use the systemic risk exception under the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 as the
mechanism for providing the debt guarantees and the increased deposit
insurance coverage. The box titled “The Systemic Risk Exception:
Origins, Definition, and Procedure” provides background on the
systemic risk exception.
The G7’s Response to the Financial Crisis: Implications for the United
States
Faced with badly deteriorating conditions in financial markets, the
Group of Seven finance ministers met in Washington, DC, and developed
a plan to address these problems, focusing on liquidity, capital, and
market stability. The plan was announced on October 8, 2008, and one of
its goals was to “take all necessary steps to unfreeze credit and money
markets and ensure that banks and other financial institutions have
broad access to liquidity and funding.” To achieve this goal, the
governments of many advanced economies decided to guarantee debt
issued by banks and other financial institutions, and to expand deposit
insurance guarantees.
Given the frozen credit and money markets and the need to coordinate


See G7 Finance Ministers, “G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Plan
of Action,” October 10, 2008, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm081010.htm.
The members of the Group of Seven are the United States, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom.


In addition to the program in the United States, some form of debt guarantee was
put in place in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. See Sebastian Schich, “Expanded Government Guarantees for Bank
Liabilities: Selected Issues,” OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2009, no. 1, 5,
http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/42779438.pdf. For the expansion
of deposit insurance coverage internationally, see International Association of
Deposit Insurers, “Discussion Paper on Cross Border Deposit Insurance Issues Raised
by
the
Global
Financial
Crisis,”
March
2011,
13–15,
http://www.iadi.org/en/assets/File/Papers/Approved%20Research%20%20Discussion%20Papers/IADI_CBDI_Paper_29_
Mar_2011_(Final_for_publication).pdf.
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with the international response to the financial crisis, the United States
had to determine what mechanism was appropriate for guaranteeing
bank debt. The U.S. Treasury Department (Treasury) later stated that if
the United States were not to take actions similar to those being
undertaken in Europe, “global market participants might turn to
institutions and markets in countries where the perceived protections
were the greatest.”
The Policy Response by U.S. Financial Regulators
For approximately ten days in October, primarily over the weekend of
October 11 and 12, senior officials from the FDIC, the Federal Reserve
System, and Treasury debated how to respond to the paralysis
throughout the credit markets. These officials had to reach agreement
on what mechanism, if any, would be appropriate for guaranteeing bank
debt, if any, and they had to agree on the extent of a transaction account
guarantee. Guaranteeing bank debt was seen as the more consequential
of the two actions, for two reasons. First, large banks needed access to the
debt markets, and needed it right away. Second, guaranteeing bank debt
would be an unprecedented foray into a type of guarantee that was totally
new for the FDIC, whereas extending the deposit guarantee would be an
incremental change.
Underpinning the need to agree on the mechanism for guaranteeing
bank debt and on the details for extending deposit coverage was the need
to choose the resources that would stand behind these guarantees. The
FDIC’s resources would clearly back insured deposits, but the debt
guarantee was more problematic. One possible channel of funds was an
appropriation by Congress. However, policymakers believed that
Congress would not authorize funds over and above those it had—most


U.S. GAO, Federal Deposit Insurance Act: Regulators’ Use of Systemic Risk Exception
Raises Moral Hazard Concerns and Opportunities Exist to Clarify the Provision, GAO-10100, 2010, 18, http://www.gao.gov/ products/GAO-10-100. For discussion of the
scope and design of foreign debt-guarantee programs, often in comparison with the
U.S. program, see Schich, “Expanded Government Guarantees”; Fabio Panetta et al.,
“An Assessment of Financial Sector Rescue Programmes,” BIS Papers 48, 2009,
http://www.bis.org/publ/ bppdf/bispap48.pdf; Aviram Levy and Sebastian Schich,
“The Design of Government Guarantees for Bank Bonds: Lessons from the Recent
Financial Crisis, OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2010, no. 1,
https://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/45636972.pdf; Aviram Levy and
Andrea Zaghini, “The Pricing of Government-Guaranteed Bank Bonds,” Banks and
Bank
Systems
6,
no.
3
(2011),
https://businessperspectives.
org/media/zoo/applications/publishing/templates/article/assets/js/pdfjs/web/41
26; and Giuseppe Grande et al., “Public Guarantees on Bank Bonds: Effectiveness and
Distortions,” OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2011, no. 2, 47–72,
http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/49200208.pdf.
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reluctantly—just provided to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
Policymakers also considered TARP itself an unlikely source of funding
for the debt guarantee. In addition, they believed that the Federal Reserve
Board (FRB) had no authority to guarantee bank debt directly. In their
view, the only available method of providing broad guarantees of bank
debt (and the only way to expand deposit insurance coverage without
congressional action) was to use the systemic risk exception (SRE),
which allowed open-bank assistance through the FDIC.
The Systemic Risk Exception: Origins, Definition, and
Procedure
The roots of the SRE can be found in concerns that FDIC
resolutions during the banking crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s
had frequently protected uninsured depositors and creditors in
addition to insured depositors. In February 1991, a
congressionally mandated study of the deposit insurance system
recommended that the FDIC should, in order to minimize the cost of
resolving failed banks, seek to limit its protection to insured
depositors whenever possible. To accomplish this goal, any failedbank resolution was to be undertaken at the least cost to the deposit
insurance fund. The study noted, however, that “the presence of
systemic risk could require a decision to protect uninsured
depositors even if it is not the least costly resolution method.”
Although the report acknowledged the FDIC’s practice of
consulting both the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (FRB) and Treasury when it chose to protect uninsured
depositors, the report stated that a systemic risk decision
demanded “a broader government consensus that systemic risk
exists and requires extraordinary government action” and
recommended that the FRB and Treasury jointly make a systemic
risk determination if they agreed on the need to protect uninsured
depositors.a
Congress incorporated the systemic risk determination into the


See Sheila Bair, Bull by the Horns: Fighting to Save Main Street from Wall Street and
Wall Street from Itself (2012), 113; Timothy Geithner, Stress Test: Reflections on
Financial Crises (2014), 226; and Ben S. Bernanke, The Courage to Act: A Memoir of a
Crisis and Its Aftermath (2015), 340.

The TLGP was not the only use of the systemic risk exception during the financial
crisis. For its application in the cases of the individual financial institutions Wachovia,
Citigroup, and Bank of America from September 2008 through January 2009, see FDIC
2017, Chapter 3.
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
(FDICIA), but amended the regulatory process that Treasury
recommended.b Unless the SRE was invoked, FDICIA prohibited
protection for uninsured depositors and other creditors if
protecting those depositors and creditors would increase a
resolution’s cost to the deposit insurance fund. It also required that
the decision to grant an SRE be made by the Secretary of the
Treasury in consultation with the President, but only after a
written recommendation by a two-thirds majority of both the
FDIC Board of Directors and the FRB. After an SRE determination
was made, the FDIC would be authorized to act or assist as
necessary to avoid the potential adverse effects of a major-bank
failure. The SRE was not used until 2008.
a

See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: U.S.
Treasury Department Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks (1991),
especially 27–28.
b

For policymakers’ views on the SRE as it was being considered, see Economic
Implications of the “Too Big to Fail Policy,” Hearing Before the U.S. House of
Representatives, Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, Committee on
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 102nd Cong. (1991).

By October 13, after days of intense negotiation, the agencies reached
agreement on the basic elements of the emergency program to guarantee
bank debt and insure a broad subset of transaction deposits. The
agreement immediately set in motion the process of requesting a
systemic risk determination, in keeping with the procedure set forth in
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991:
the FDIC Board and the FRB voted to recommend a systemic risk
exception to the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary—after
consulting with the President—quickly determined that a systemic risk
existed.
The resulting program—the two-part Temporary Liquidity Guarantee
Program (TLGP)—was announced on October 14 in a joint press
conference by the FDIC, the U.S. Treasury Department, and the Federal
Reserve. In announcing the program, FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair
emphasized that it was needed to stabilize the financial system and that
it would be funded through fees charged to participating financial
institutions, not taxpayers and not the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF),
which was intended to protect the deposits of bank customers.7 The
See FDIC, “Statement by FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair,” FDIC Joint Press Conference
with U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve, Press Release, October 14, 2008,
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08100a.html.
7
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TLGP was a crucial element of a three-part U.S. government response to
the financial crisis. The other two parts were the Treasury’s capital
injections into banks under the TARP, and the Commercial Paper
Funding Facility (CPFF) under the aegis of the FRB. The three programs
were designed to work together.
Policy Discussions: The Details of the TLGP
To reach agreement about the details of the debt guarantee program,
policymakers had to resolve several complex issues. One was whether
to guarantee bank debt that was already outstanding. There was concern
that such a broad guarantee might prove too large a liability to cover and
might create a windfall for those institutions that had invested in bank
debt, but arguments were also made that the guarantee needed to be as
wide as possible. Another issue was whether to guarantee debt issued by
bank holding companies (BHCs) and their nonbank affiliates. Some
worries were expressed that there might have been legal impediments
to guaranteeing such debt, and questions were raised about whether
such a guarantee was in fact desirable. However, the view was also held
that not guaranteeing debt issued by BHCs would leave U.S. banks at a
competitive disadvantage since European debt guarantee programs
would cover the debt issued by the large universal banks in those
countries. A third area of debate was whether to assess a fee for
guarantees, and a fourth was whether creditors should bear any loss on
bonds whose issuers defaulted. On the question of fees charged to
entities that would issue guaranteed debt, there was agreement that a
fee should be assessed but a spectrum of opinion on how much the fee
should be. Arguments were made for (1) a minimal fee to encourage
participation, (2) a fee calibrated to replicate funding costs during normal
market conditions, and (3) a fee that took into account the cost of
potential defaults. As for creditors bearing loss if a bond issuer defaulted,
an early proposal suggested that creditors bear a 10 percent loss on such
bonds, but many policymakers viewed this as undercutting the purpose
of the guarantee.
In the end it was agreed that the debt guarantee program would cover
only newly issued debt and for a limited range of maturities. BHC debt
would be covered, but with a limitation on thrift holding companies’


For an overview of the CPFF, see Tobias Adrian et al., “The Federal Reserve’s
Commercial Paper Funding Facility,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic
Policy Review, May 2011, 25–39.


This discussion is based on Bair, Bull by the Horns, 109–20; Geithner, Stress Test,
226–38; and Bernanke, The Courage to Act, 339–42.
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ability to participate in the debt guarantee program and with the
proviso that the FDIC would approve applications for guarantees of
debt issued by nonbank affiliates of BHCs on a case-by-case basis. These
restrictions were necessitated by the large number of thrift holding
companies and BHC affiliates and the attendant difficulty in assessing
the risk to the FDIC from guaranteeing their debt. The costs to program
participants would be low but meaningful, and creditors would not face
a loss on bonds whose issuers defaulted.
To reach agreement on the expansion of deposit insurance coverage,
policymakers had to decide whether to expand deposit insurance
coverage beyond what the FDIC already offered and, if so, to what
extent. Bank deposits were an important form of liquidity for many
smaller banks, and such banks faced risk from potential runs by entities
holding deposits above the insurance limit, such as small businesses
and municipalities. To forestall such runs, the FDIC had argued several
weeks earlier that the agency should extend an unlimited guarantee to
transaction accounts at banks, believing that such a guarantee would
promote public confidence in banks, but at that time the proposal for
such a guarantee was not adopted. It was later noted that there had
been a general opposition to such an expansion of deposit insurance
because of moral hazard, but that during the crisis, expansion of the
insurance guarantee was thought to be warranted because, without it,
there could be rapid deposit outflows from smaller banks into banks
that were perceived to be too big to fail.
In the end, the proposal for an unlimited guarantee of transaction
accounts at banks was agreed to as part of the TLGP. The policymakers
therefore ended up striking a balance among their varying views on
providing these two forms of assistance to the financial system.
The Case for a Systemic Risk Exception
At the same time that these policy discussions were being held, FDIC
staff was gathering data and other information to support the case for
a systemic risk exception. The information was assembled in a
memorandum that the FDIC Board would consider before voting on the
issue.10 The memorandum documented the growing and
unprecedented disruption in credit markets and the concomitant
effects on banks’ ability to obtain funding and to extend credit. Banks
had responded to the crisis by retaining cash and tightening lending
This section is largely based on that memo: FDIC, “Memorandum to the Board of
Directors: FDIC Guarantee of Bank Debt,” October 13, 2008. For further discussion of
the events and trends during the second half of 2008, see FDIC 2017, Chapter 1.
10
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standards. Borrowing by businesses, households, and state and local
governments had slowed significantly, and the trend was likely to
continue. The interbank market as defined by the TED (TreasuryEurodollar) spread was normally stable at just below 25 basis points
(bps), but the spread had been rising significantly since 2007; by
August 2008 the spread had risen to 238 bps, and by October 9, to 415
bps (see Figure 2.1). At this level almost no interbank lending was
taking place, and banks had ceased lending in the federal funds
market.11
Figure 2.1. Interbank Lending Spreads, December 2006–December 2010

The federal funds market allowed commercial banks that had excess reserves on
deposit at regional Federal Reserve banks to lend those funds to financial institutions
that had liquidity needs.
11
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In addition, since Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., filed for bankruptcy,
on September 15, even creditworthy companies had been having
difficulty successfully issuing commercial paper, especially at longer
maturities, and any debt that was being issued carried extremely high
interest rates even for very short-term instruments. Securitization
markets for both residential and commercial mortgage-backed
securities had essentially shut down, and issuances of other types of
asset-backed securities had also fallen drastically. Flight to safety had
greatly increased Treasury “fails” (the failure to deliver Treasury
securities), demonstrating both increased demand for U.S. government
securities and the scarcity of these securities.
Short-term funding markets in particular were essentially frozen, and
in this environment many banks and BHCs found it hard to replace
funding at a reasonable cost. The short-term funding channels that
were normally available to financial institutions had become
problematic and expensive, when they were available at all. Figure 2.2
shows the unusual length of time during which almost no bank senior
unsecured debt was issued after the Lehman bankruptcy. Had the TLGP
not been implemented, that situation could have continued.
In addition, the FDIC had examined the effect that a 5-percent run on
uninsured deposits would have on economic activity and found that a
stressed environment could reduce GDP growth by nearly 2 percent
per year, a reduction that could either create or prolong a recession.12
Although no evidence suggested that such a large run was happening,
uninsured deposits were leaving banks that were perceived to be
troubled, and the FDIC had anecdotal evidence that even healthy banks
were experiencing deposit outflows.

12

See 73 Fed. Reg. 64180 (Oct. 29, 2008).
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Figure 2.2. Trends in Senior Unsecured U.S. Bank Debt Issuance before
and after September 2008

The Systemic Risk Exception Reinterpreted
Before the 2008 crisis, policymakers and industry observers generally
thought that FDICIA’s systemic risk exception was intended to apply to
an individual troubled institution. The situation that policymakers
were confronting in 2008, however, involved not only the possible
failure of a single institution, or even of a single market, but dysfunction
throughout much of the financial system. These circumstances led
policymakers to reexamine the scope of the systemic risk exception.
Their rationale for viewing the systemic risk exception as appropriate
in this set of conditions was, first, that the intent of the proposed twopart TLGP was to mitigate the effects of credit market disruption and
lessen the losses to the FDIC that would likely result from inaction.
Second, safeguards were built into the two component programs: the
guarantees would be limited in duration and scope; the programs
would be industry funded, with a fee structure that was expected to
protect the DIF; and the participating institutions would be subject to
careful oversight. Finally, the total proposed program was integral to
the overall three-part U.S. response to systemic risk in the banking
system (as noted above, the other two parts were the Treasury’s TARP
capital infusions and the Federal Reserve’s CPFF).
11
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The FDIC’s Board of Directors, while unanimously approving the
systemic risk exception and strongly supporting the TLGP, was well
aware that the agency was heading into new territory: then Vice
Chairman Martin Gruenberg remarked that “this action being proposed
today…is perhaps the most extraordinary ever taken by an FDIC
Board.” Given the innovative nature of the action, House and Senate
leaders had been consulted in advance about the steps the regulatory
agencies were going to take, and their support was obtained. More than
one Board member observed that Congress would need to examine the
statutory framework of the systemic risk exception to see if the
exception as originally conceived was adequate to cover circumstances
not foreseen in 1991, when the law was written.13 The box titled
Questions about the Statutory Authority for the TLGP” discusses the
legal underpinnings for the guarantees provided by the FDIC under the
new program.
Questions about the Statutory Authority for the TLGP
In 2010, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined the use
of the systemic risk exception in 2008–2009. The report noted that the
height of the financial crisis was the first time the government had used the
exception and that the TLGP was created at a time of “volatile economic
circumstances.”
The report went on to explain that the agencies (the FDIC, FRB, and
Treasury) believed that FDICIA as drafted was unclear on how the systemic
risk determination should be applied. Holding this belief, they thought the
law’s provisions could be interpreted to allow a systemic risk determination
when either the banking industry as a whole or just a single institution was
in danger of causing the entire financial system to collapse. Moreover, the
agencies believed that “a systemic risk determination waives all of the
normal statutory restrictions on FDIC assistance, as well as creating new
authority to provide assistance, both as to types of aid provided and as to the
entities that may receive it.” Given these interpretations, the agencies chose
to make what they called a “generic systemic risk determination.” They
based their choice on two assumptions about bank-by-bank assistance: it
would be ineffective, and it would be more costly to the FDIC than would the
TLGP.
The GAO acknowledged that it found some support for the agencies’
positions that the systemic risk exception could be used both to authorize

13

FDIC, Board of Directors Meeting Minutes (Oct. 13, 2008).
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the TLGP and to provide assistance of the scope that the TLGP provided, but
the GAO also found that the agencies’ interpretations were open to question
and raised significant policy issues. The report recommended that Congress
clarify the statutory language about the requirements for, and assistance
provided under, a systemic risk exception. Congress revised the language
as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
in July 2010 (see the conclusion of this paper).
For a detailed analysis, see U.S. GAO, Federal Deposit Insurance Act:
Regulators’ Use of Systemic Risk Exception (2010), 43–57.
a

The Creation of the TLGP and Initial Participation
The TLGP was a complex program that needed to be created quickly.
Normally any FDIC program, let alone one entirely new for the agency,
would go through a relatively long rulemaking process before being put
in place. But because of the emergent nature of the financial crisis, the
TLGP took effect as soon as it was announced, on October 14; the
announcement was based on the FDIC’s best attempts to assemble an
intricate program during the first two weeks in October. Immediately
after announcing the two component programs of the TLGP, the FDIC
briefed potential participants on how the Corporation expected the
programs to work.14
Just two weeks later, on October 29, the FDIC issued an interim final
rule that elaborated on the broad outlines and specific elements
previously presented, and at the same time the agency sought
comments, though on a much more expedited schedule than usual.15
The interim final rule was amended on November 7 (again with a
request for comments), and the final rule was adopted on November
21, only five weeks after the TLGP had been announced.16 Many of the
comments helped improve the effectiveness of the program,
The transcripts of the conference calls can be found at
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/tlgp/archive.html.
15 If an agency has enough reason to issue a final rule without first publishing a
proposed rule, such a rule is often called an interim final rule; this kind of rule
becomes effective on publication, but an agency may amend it later in response to
public comments, as was the case with the TLGP interim final rule.
16 See 73 Fed. Reg. 64179 (Oct. 29, 2008); 73 Fed. Reg. 66160 (Nov. 7, 2008); and 73
Fed. Reg. 72244 (Nov. 26, 2008).
14
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particularly the debt guarantee component, as a tool for bringing
stability to the financial markets.17
The TLGP was structured as a voluntary program. When it began, all
eligible entities18 were automatically enrolled for the first 30 days at no
cost, after which fees would be assessed to participants, and eligible
entities would be allowed to opt out of either the Debt Guarantee
Program (DGP) or the Transaction Account Guarantee Program (TAGP)
or both.19 To eliminate an adverse selection problem (only the weakest
entities would opt in, while stronger ones would opt out), all entities
within a holding company were required to make the same decision
about the DGP.
More than half of the over 14,000 eligible entities decided to remain in
the DGP during its initial period (the DGP would later be extended
beyond its initial period, as discussed below), and more than 7,100
banks and thrifts, or 86 percent of FDIC-insured institutions, decided
to remain in the TAGP. Most of the institutions that opted out of the DGP
were those that had less than $1 billion in assets and issued no
appreciable amount of senior unsecured debt. In addition, the FDIC
placed restrictions on many entities’ participation in the DGP (see the
next section for more detail).

Some of the most significant changes made in response to comments were the
following: the definition of senior unsecured debt was revised; an alternative cap was
provided for banks that had either no senior unsecured debt outstanding or only fed
funds purchased; the debt guarantee limits of a participating insured depository
institution and its parent BHC were combined; the timely payment of principal and
interest following payment default was guaranteed; and the transaction accounts
guarantee was broadened to cover both Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTAs)
and negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts. Many of these changes are
discussed below in the sections on the DGP and the TAGP.
18 Eligible entities were (1) an insured depository institution; (2) a U.S. bank holding
company, provided that it controlled (directly or indirectly) at least one subsidiary
that was a chartered and operating insured depository institution; (3) a U.S. savings
and loan holding company (with certain limitations), provided that it controlled
(directly or indirectly) at least one subsidiary that was a chartered and operating
insured depository institution; and (4) any other affiliates of an insured depository
institution that the FDIC in its discretion designated an eligible entity. (See 73 Fed.
Reg. 64181 [Oct. 29, 2008] and 73 Fed. Reg. 72266 [Nov. 26, 2008]).
19 When the nine largest banks were informed on the afternoon of October 13 that
they had to accept capital infusions under TARP, they were also told that they had to
opt in to the DGP. (See Henry Paulson, On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse
of the Global Financial System [2010], 364). Several months later, one observer would
note that while some of the largest banks eagerly sought to exit the TARP, they were
not similarly eager to abandon the TLGP. (See Andrew Bary, “How Do You Spell Sweet
Deal? For Banks, It’s TLGP,” Barron’s, April 20, 2009).
17
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The Debt Guarantee Program
The DGP provided liquidity by guaranteeing participating entities’
newly issued senior unsecured borrowing, thereby allowing
participants to roll over maturing debt or issue additional debt.
Ground Rules and Extensions
The program excluded certain types of debt instruments, as it was
specifically designed not to encourage exotic or complex funding
structures and not to protect lenders who sought to make risky loans.20
Generally the FDIC capped guaranteed debt issuance at 125 percent of
an entity’s senior unsecured debt that was outstanding as of September
30, 2008, and was scheduled to mature on or before June 30, 2009. The
cap was set at this level to allow participants to roll over existing debt
and have some room for their debt issuance to grow. For entities with
no senior unsecured debt outstanding as of September 30, 2008, or
with only federal funds outstanding, the limit was set at 2 percent of
consolidated total liabilities as of September 30, 2008.
As a condition of participation in the program, entities agreed to
comply with any FDIC request that they provide relevant information
about their debt issuances under the program. Another condition was
that entities agreed to be subject to periodic FDIC on-site reviews (after
the FDIC consulted with the appropriate federal banking regulator) to
determine the entity’s compliance with the terms and requirements of
the DGP. The FDIC also had discretion to terminate an entity’s
continued participation in the DGP after consulting with the entity’s
primary federal regulator.21
Initially the DGP allowed participating entities to issue guaranteed debt
until June 30, 2009, with the guarantee set to expire on the earlier of
the maturity of the debt or June 30, 2012. In May 2009, however, the
FDIC extended the program to reduce potential market disruption and
20 Debt eligible for the guarantee included federal funds purchased, promissory notes,

commercial paper, unsubordinated unsecured notes (including zero-coupon bonds),
and certain U.S. dollar-denominated certificates of deposit. From the program’s
inception through December 5, 2008, the DGP covered debt with a maturity of 30 days
or less, but in response to comments on the interim rule, the FDIC excluded debt with
a maturity of 30 days or less and focused on stable, longer-term sources of funding,
where liquidity was most lacking. The DGP was extended in 2009 to cover mandatory
convertible debt. (See 74 Fed. Reg. 9522 [Mar. 4, 2009]). The guarantee for such debt
was set to expire on the earlier of the maturity of the debt, the conversion date, or
June 30, 2012.
21

Both the on-site review authority and the termination authority were rarely used.
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to facilitate an orderly phase-out of the program.22 The issuance
deadline was extended four months, to October 31, 2009, and the
guarantee period was extended six months, expiring December 31,
2012. Participating entities that had issued DGP debt on or before April
1, 2009, could use the extension automatically, but others had to
receive FDIC approval to use it. No entities that had opted out of the
initial phase were permitted to make use of the extension. Debt
outstanding over the course of the program is presented in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3. DGP Debt Outstanding, October 2008–December 2012

Source: FDIC

22

74 Fed. Reg. 26521 (Jun. 3, 2009).
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Pricing and Limits on Participation
To compensate for the FDIC’s risk, entities that issued debt were
assessed fees. Initially the Corporation proposed an annualized flatrate 75 basis-point fee, after determining (by using credit default swap
[CDS] spreads) that that amount would be substantially above the cost
of “normal” credit protection but much lower than the very wide CDS
spreads in October 2008. This proposed fee structure was the product
of consultation with the Federal Reserve and Treasury. In response to
industry comments, however, the FDIC altered the flat-rate fee to a
sliding fee schedule, with fees ranging from 50 to 100 basis points,
increasing for longer-maturity debt.23 In addition, for holding
companies whose affiliated banks’ assets constituted less than half of
the holding company’s consolidated assets, the FDIC increased DGP
fees by 10 basis points. Finally, in conjunction with the program’s
extension in May 2009, the FDIC added a surcharge to the guarantee
fee on debt with a maturity of one year or greater issued after April 1,
2009. The surcharge varied depending on the type of institution issuing
the debt, with banks paying the lowest fees.24
Some economists have suggested that the FDIC might have been better
served by adopting a more discriminating pricing method, such as the
market-based pricing mechanisms used by many similar European
programs. For example, pricing for the UK program started with a flat
base charge supplemented by an institution’s median five-year CDS
spread in 2007, the year before the program’s implementation. One
study, using a sample of banks in both countries (U.S. and UK),
calculated a “fair price” for the guarantee by using an average threeyear CDS spread in November 2008, and compared the calculated fair
price with the average UK guarantee fee and with the flat U.S. fee. The
study found that the average UK fee was higher than the average
23 An annualized fee of 50 basis points was applied to debt with a maturity of 180 days

or less. The fees increased to 75 basis points for debt with a maturity of 181 to 364
days, and to 100 basis points for debt with a maturity of 365 days or more. 73 Fed.
Reg. 72244 (Nov. 26, 2008).
24 The surcharge was intended to compensate members of the Deposit Insurance
Fund (DIF) (including those that did not issue FDIC-guaranteed debt) for bearing the
risk that TLGP fees would be insufficient and that, as explained in the section below
on the TLGP’s effects and costs, a systemic risk assessment would be levied on all
insured institutions. Unlike the initial DGP guarantee fees, which were reserved for
possible DGP losses and segregated from the DIF, the amount of any surcharge
collected in connection with the extended DGP was to be deposited into the DIF and
used by the FDIC when calculating the fund’s reserve ratio. (See 74 Fed. Reg. 26521,
26523 [Jun. 3, 2009]). For an explanation of the fund’s reserve ratio, see FDIC 2017,
Chapter 5.
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calculated fair price (133.7 bps vs. 109.6 bps) but that the flat U.S. fee
was substantially lower than the calculated fair price (75 bps vs. 255.4
bps).25 These results imply that the U.S. DGP provided a large subsidy
to U.S. banks. A later study sought to quantify the subsidy, using a
sample of almost $200 billion in guaranteed debt issued by six large
U.S. entities. The study found that the six institutions saved almost $20
billion over the life of the bonds compared with what they would have
spent for nonguaranteed debt; in other words, they saved substantially
more than they paid the FDIC for the guarantee.26 As mentioned above,
when the FDIC extended the DGP for four months beyond the original
intended expiration of the program, surcharges were added for certain
types of guaranteed debt, not only to encourage banks to exit the
program but also to “reduce the subsidy provided by the DGP.”27
It is important to understand that pricing was not the only tool the FDIC
had available to address DGP-related risks. Not all institutions were
permitted to participate in the DGP, and the FDIC limited others’ ability
to do so. Specifically, the rule implementing the DGP permitted the
FDIC, working with an entity’s primary federal regulator, to make
exceptions to the entity’s debt guarantee limit—to increase, reduce, or
restrict in some way the entity’s ability to issue debt.28 The Corporation
used this discretion extensively to mitigate its risk of loss from the DGP.
In using this discretion, the FDIC and the other federal banking
agencies developed a consultative process to review the debt limits of
otherwise eligible entities that had adverse regulatory ratings29 or poor
financial metrics, such as very high past-due ratios or poor
capitalization, and in the case of several hundred weak institutions, the
Corporation reduced to zero the amount of guaranteed debt they could
issue. From the very start of the program, no troubled entities (those
25 See V. Acharya

and R. Sundaram, “The Financial Sector Bailout: Sowing the Seeds of
the Next Crisis?” in Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, ed. V.
Acharya and M. Richardson (2009), 327–39. The authors wrote the piece before the
FDIC changed its pricing from 75 bps to the 50–100 bps scale depending on maturity;
although this change would have altered their results somewhat, it would not have
altered their conclusions.
26 Levy and Zaghini, “The Pricing of Government-Guaranteed Bank Bonds.” The
authors note that the total issuance was $184.9 billion, so even if all of the debt had
incurred a fee of 100 bps, the total fee would have been less than $2 billion.
27 74 Fed. Reg. 26523 (Jun. 3, 2009). The surcharges were also added to compensate
DIF members (see note 24).
28 73 Fed. Reg. 72267 (Nov. 26, 2008).
29 The regulatory agencies rate both insured depository institutions and BHCs on a
scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the highest rating and 5 the lowest.
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with supervisory ratings of 4 or 5) had been allowed to issue
guaranteed debt, and soon thereafter the restriction was expanded to
include many 3-rated entities as well as de novo banks (the latter have
a significantly higher likelihood of failure than do established
institutions). In all, the FDIC restricted the participation of more than
1,600 banks and thrifts and 1,400 BHCs, or approximately 35 percent
of banks and thrifts and 39 percent of bank holding companies and
other eligible affiliates that had opted into the program as of year-end
2008.
Challenges: Payment of Claims and Legal Issues
Of the several challenges the FDIC faced in creating the DGP, the most
significant one was how to address the payment of claims under the
program. Another was how to handle numerous technical details.
Having never undertaken such a guarantee before, the Corporation was
confronted with both a novel problem and a natural tendency to think
in terms of its longstanding methods for handling insured deposits. As
a result, the initial interim rule the FDIC put forward for the payment
of claims relied for triggers on the receivership process for banks and
on bankruptcy filings for BHCs—but neither of those adequately took
into account the expectations of market participants for prompt
payment.30 In addition, the issue of timely payment could have had
serious implications for how the rating agencies treated TLGPguaranteed debt.
Indeed, Euroweek described the program as having been “on the brink
of collapse” in early November and noted that senior bankers were
“highly dissatisfied with the scheme as it then stood and predicted
disaster for it.”31 After the initial interim rule was published, parties
that commented on it—including representatives of Bank of America,
Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase,
Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo—urged that FDIC regulations provide
that payment be made as principal and interest became due and
Initially, the FDIC proposed two different methods for the payment of claims, one
for insured depository institutions (IDIs), the other for BHCs. For IDIs, the FDIC
expected to use its established receivership process, which the agency believed would
in most cases lead to payment of claims the next business day after failure so long as
the claim was determined to be valid. For BHCs, the FDIC stated it intended to pay
principal plus interest to the debtholder when the BHC filed for bankruptcy, but only
after the claim was allowed under the bankruptcy code. If the FDIC did not pay within
one business day of the filing, the agency would pay interest on the debt at the 90-day
Treasury bill rate in effect at the time of the filing. 73 Fed. Reg. 64184-85 (Oct. 29,
2008).
31 Euroweek, “FDIC Fiddling Rescues Bank Liquidity Plan,” November 28, 2008, 10.
30
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payable, and they noted that if the FDIC failed to make payment as soon
as an issuer defaulted, the demand for DGP debt would be severely
curtailed because likely purchasers would be very concerned about
timely receipt of scheduled payments with minimal risk exposure.32
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) stated that in order for FDIC-guaranteed debt
“to qualify for rating substitution treatment [in other words, for FDICguaranteed debt to receive the same rating as debt of the U.S.
government], the terms of a guarantee had to be unconditional,
irrevocable, and timely.” S&P warned, however, that the initial interim
rule made it “uncertain whether payment of interest and principal
under [the FDIC’s] guarantee would have to be made on a timely basis”
and that, indeed, “there appears to be the potential for a significant
delay in payment beyond the terms specified in the debt, even though
ultimate repayment is expected.” S&P indicated that under the interim
rule, guaranteed debt would “result in, at most, limited rating elevation
for guaranteed obligations” and that unless the proposal was amended,
“we would be unable to rate the debt of financial institutions qualifying
for the FDIC guarantees at the ‘AAA’ rating of the U.S. government.”33
Such an outcome would have greatly reduced the effectiveness of the
DGP.
The FDIC recognized the validity of the commenters’ concerns, and the
final rule, in November 2008, incorporated changes that assured
debtholders they would continue to receive timely payments following
payment default without compromising the FDIC’s ability to obtain
See,
for
example,
the
comment
letter
at
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2008/08c39AD37.pdf. The FDIC
sought to acquire knowledge about the debt markets, and during the week of October
27, staff met with representatives of both S&P and Fitch to discuss their methods of
rating debt securities.
33 Tanya Azarchs and Scott Sprinzen, “U.S. Guarantees of Bank Debt under Interim
Rules Do Not Promise Timely Payment,” Standard & Poor’s Ratings Direct (November
10, 2008), 2. Quotations from this publication are reproduced with permission of
Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC. Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC
(S&P) does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or availability of
any information, including ratings, and is not responsible for any errors or omissions
(negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, or for the results obtained from the
use of ratings. S&P gives no express or implied warranties, including, but not limited
to, any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose or use. S&P
shall not be liable for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory,
punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses
(including lost income or profits and opportunity costs) in connection with any use
of ratings. S&P’s ratings are statements of opinions and are not statements of fact or
recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell securities. They do not address the
market value of securities or the suitability of securities for investment purposes and
should not be relied on as investment advice.
32
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enough information to pay claims appropriately.34
The trigger for the payment obligation was changed from a bank failure
or a bankruptcy filing to a payment default.35 In addition, the FDIC’s
satisfaction of the guarantee would be such that the agency would
continue to make scheduled interest and principal payments under the
terms of the debt through its maturity.36 These changes addressed the
concerns of both the industry and the rating agencies.37 With the
program improvements in place, eligible entities quickly responded
and, instead of claiming that the DGP was near collapse, Euroweek
described it as having gotten off to “a scorching start,” with several
large U.S. banks issuing $17 billion in guaranteed debt in late November
after having been denied access to the market for months. The
publication continued: “Clearly the once-reviled plan [had] … been
given a clean bill of health by the market.38 (The box below titled
“Institutions Using the Debt Guarantee Program” provides information
about the use of the DGP by the largest financial institutions in the
country—the group that issued the bulk of guaranteed debt. The
appendix lists all the issuers of $250 million or more in debt guaranteed
under the program.)
Another important challenge was how to address numerous legal
issues having to do with participation in the DGP. The final rule dealt
with these difficulties by requiring an issuing entity to execute and file
with the FDIC a “Master Agreement” that (1) acknowledged the
establishment of a debt to the FDIC for any payment made under the
program and agreed to honor the FDIC’s demand for payment on the
debt immediately; (2) arranged for the DGP debtholder (a) to assign to
73 Fed. Reg. 72260 (Nov. 26, 2008).
35 For the changes described here, see 73 Fed. Reg. 72263–4 (Nov. 26, 2008).
36 For debt with final maturities beyond the DGP’s expiration, the FDIC could elect at
any time after that date to pay all outstanding principal and interest under the debt
issuance.
37 For example, on November 24, Moody’s Investors Service announced that it would
assign TLGP-guaranteed debt a rating of “Aaa,” the same rating it assigned the U.S.
government, noting that the changes made to the program ensured timely payment
(Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Will Assign Backed-Aaa Ratings to Debt
Securities Covered by the FDIC’s Guarantee,” Global Credit Research, November 24,
2008, https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-will-assign-backed-Aaa-ratingsto-debt-securities-covered--PR_167951). There remained some operational
questions about how parties would proceed in the event of a default on DGPguaranteed commercial paper. These questions were settled in April 2009 by a
Memorandum of Understanding agreed to by the FDIC, the Depository Trust Clearing
Corporation, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the U.S. Treasury.
38 Euroweek, “Goldman Leads TLGP Off to a Flying Start,” November 28, 2008, 9.
34
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the FDIC all rights and interests in that debt upon the FDIC’s payment
under the guarantee and (b) to release the FDIC from any further
liability with respect to that particular debt issuance; and (3) provided
that the issuer could elect to designate an authorized representative to
make claims on behalf of debtholders (claimants could choose, instead,
to file with the FDIC individually, but the existence of an authorized
representative for a class of debtholders was expected to permit a
much faster response to a claim).
***
By mid-2009, financial markets were stabilizing, and DGP issuance was
down significantly. In October, the FDIC approved a final rule ending
the DGP on the last day of that month (on October 31, 2009), but with
an emergency guarantee facility available on a case-by-case basis
through April 30, 2010.39 The emergency facility carried very high fees
(300 basis points). In announcing the availability of the emergency
guarantee facility, Bair stated, “It should be clear that this is not a
continuation of the program, but an ending of the program with just a
short-term facility that is only available for clearly unforeseen and
unexpected events.”40 The FDIC had always intended that the program
be temporary; the emergency facility was never used and the DGP
ended as scheduled on October 31, 2009.

74 Fed. Reg. 54743 (Oct. 23, 2009).0
“Way Out Gets Clearer as TLGP to End,” American Banker, October 21,
2009, 1.
39

40 Emily Flitter,
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Institutions Using the Debt Guarantee Program
Entities using the DGP ranged from small community banks to the largest
financial institutions in the country, with the latter group issuing the bulk of
guaranteed debt. The largest issuer was Citigroup, including Citibank and
eligible affiliates, which issued almost $176 billion of guaranteed debt over
the course of the program. Among banking organizations, the second-largest
issuer was Bank of America Corporation, including its bank and eligible
affiliates, which issued almost $131 billion; and the next-highest issuers
among banking organizations were JPMorgan Chase & Company, its bank
and affiliates; Goldman Sachs Group Inc.; and Morgan Stanley. Each of the
three issued over $30 billion in guaranteed debt.

The second largest issuer of DGP debt overall was General Electric Capital
Corporation (GECC), which was a savings and loan holding company by
virtue of its indirecta ownership of GE Money Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah. The
FDIC’s TLGP rule allowed such holding companies to participate in the DGP,
but only if they were engaged solely in activities permissible for a financial
holding company under section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act. b
GECC was, however, not solely engaged in those permitted activities, and so
instead it applied (as was also a allowed) to participate based on its status as
an affiliate of an insured depository institution that had received the
requisite endorsement from the appropriate federal banking regulator (in
this case, the Office of Thrift Supervision). After some discussion between
GECC’s parent, General Electric (GE) and the government, the FDIC approved
the firm’s participation. The FDIC judged GECC’s capital and risk
management to be solid, and since GE agreed to guarantee the FDIC against
23
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loss, GECC’s fees would help bolster the FDIC’s reserves and offset potential
losses in the DGP.c
A number of U.S. bank subsidiaries of very large foreign banking
organizations also issued guaranteed debt; these included Union Bank (the
U.S. subsidiary of Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc.); HSBC Bank USA,
National Association (the U.S. subsidiary of HSBC Holdings, PLC); and Bank
of the West (the U.S. subsidiary of BNP Paribas).
a GECC’s two bank subsidiaries (GE Money Bank and GE Capital Financial,
Inc.) were direct, wholly owned subsidiaries of GE Consumer Finance, Inc.,
which was wholly owned by GECC.
b 12 U.S.C. §1843(k).
c On GECC, see Paulson, On the Brink, 373, 400; and Bair, Bull by the Horns,
118.

The Transaction Account Guarantee Program:
Purpose, Fees, and Extensions
Under the TAGP, the FDIC provided a guarantee of all funds held in noninterest-bearing transaction accounts at participating banks until
December 31, 2009 (the guarantee was extended twice, first through
June 30, 2010, and then through December 31, 2010, as discussed
below).41 The program was intended to encourage customers to keep
their deposits in their bank and thereby avoid runs at healthy banks.
More particularly, the TAGP addressed the concern of bankers and
others that, given the uncertain economic conditions, without the
guarantee banks could lose many small-business accounts (including
payroll accounts), which frequently exceed the insurance limit of
$250,000.42
41 The interim rule defined a

qualifying account as “a transaction account with respect
to which interest is neither accrued nor paid and on which the insured depository
institution does not reserve the right to require advance notice of an intended
withdrawal” (see 73 Fed. Reg., 64182 [Oct. 29, 2008]). But after receiving comments
on the interim rule, the FDIC extended the TAGP to cover certain other types of
deposit accounts important to sole proprietorships and charitable organizations.
These included Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTAs) and negotiable order of
withdrawal (NOW) accounts where the participating institution committed to
maintaining a rate no higher than 0.5 percent; this maximum was lowered to 0.25
percent as part of the second extension of the program.
42 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 temporarily raised the basic
FDIC insurance limit from $100,000 to $250,000 effective October 3, 2008; Dodd-
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The TAGP marked the first time the FDIC had offered deposit insurance
above the statutory limit. In effect, the program gave institutions the
option of purchasing deposit insurance for the otherwise uninsured
balances of non-interest-bearing transaction accounts. In this way,
assistance could be provided to smaller institutions that did not benefit
from the DGP. This is not to say that larger institutions did not also
participate in and benefit from the TAGP, for they did, but it is
noteworthy that during the program’s extension through 2010, the
proportional participation of banks with more than $10 billion in assets
dropped far more than did the proportional participation of smaller
banks.
Like the DGP, the TAGP imposed fees for using the program. The TAGP
initially applied a 10 basis-point annual assessment rate surcharge on
non-interest-bearing transaction deposits and other qualifying
accounts for amounts over $250,000; with the first extension, the fee
was increased (see next paragraph). The total deposits covered by the
TAGP are represented in Figure 2.4.
The TAGP proved effective at preventing potentially disruptive shifts in
deposit funding. As noted earlier in this section, the TAGP was intended
to expire on December 31, 2009, but because bank failures continued
to increase during 2009, the FDIC was concerned that terminating the
TAGP too quickly could unnerve uninsured depositors and undo the
progress made in restoring credit markets. Therefore, the FDIC Board
extended the TAGP for an additional six months, through June 30,
2010.43 As part of this extension, the surcharge was increased from a
flat rate of 10 basis points to a risk-based rate. Participating banks paid
an assessment rate of 15, 20, or 25 basis points, depending on the
institution’s deposit insurance assessment category (for deposit
insurance assessment categories, see FDIC 2017, Chapter 5).
Institutions participating in the TAGP were allowed to opt out of the
program effective on January 1, 2010. Over 6,400 institutions (or 93
percent of the institutions that were participating at year-end 2009)
elected to continue in the TAGP through June 30, 2010.

Frank, in 2010, made the increase permanent.
43 74 Fed. Reg. 45093 (Sept. 1, 2009).
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Figure 2.4. Amounts Guaranteed by the TAGP, 2008–2010

Source: FDIC

Even after that first extension, the lingering consequences of the
financial crisis and recession continued to put pressure on banks’
earnings and asset quality. Those effects were expected to persist and
could have had the potential to undermine banks, particularly banks
exposed to local markets that had experienced the greatest distress.
The FDIC was concerned that allowing the TAGP to expire in June as
scheduled could lead to the withdrawals of large transaction accounts
at many community banks, possibly resulting in needless liquidity
failures of those banks or lower deposit franchise values (for a
discussion of franchise value, see FDCI 2017, Chapter 6). The FDIC
therefore authorized a second six-month extension, until December 31,
2010, leaving in place the surcharges that had been imposed during the
first extension. The Corporation left open the possibility of yet a third
extension, but not beyond year-end 2011.44 However, passage of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank) in July 2010 eliminated the need for such an extension, as the
law mandated that the FDIC provide an unlimited guarantee, funded by
the DIF, of all non-interest-bearing transaction accounts from
December 31, 2010, through December 31, 2012.45 Thus, the TAGP
See 75 Fed. Reg. 20247–65 (Apr. 19, 2010).
For the implementation of the Dodd-Frank provisions regarding unlimited
coverage of non-interest-bearing transaction accounts, see 75 Fed. Reg. 69577 (Nov.
44
45
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ended on December 31, 2010.

The TLGP: Effects and Costs
The DGP enabled financial institutions to meet their financing needs
during a period of systemwide turmoil. At a time when banks and other
eligible institutions were unable to roll over their debt at reasonable
rates and terms, the DGP reopened the short- and medium-term debt
markets by allowing participating institutions to issue an array of
guaranteed debt instruments. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show that the eligible
entities, after issuing mostly short-term debt (commercial paper) at the
very beginning of the program, increasingly moved toward issuing debt
at longer maturities.
Figure 2.5. DGP Debt Outstanding by Type, October 2008–December
2009

Source: FDIC

15, 2010). The guarantee provided under Dodd-Frank did not, however, cover IOLTAs
or NOW accounts. On December 29, 2010, a subsequent statute amended the
definition of non-interest-bearing transaction accounts to include IOLTAs. The FDIC
implemented the amended definition effective January 27, 2011 (see 76 Fed. Reg.
4813 [Jan. 27, 2011]).
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Figure 2.6. Maturities of TLGP Debt Outstanding at Month End, October
2008–October 2009

Source: FDIC

Figure 2.7. Funding Costs: TLGP Debt vs. Non-Guaranteed Debt, January
2007–October 2009
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Specifically, the DGP lowered the cost of funding. For participating
entities, the explicit FDIC guarantee—coming at a time when credit
market spreads had reached record-high levels—meant that DGP debt
was assigned an AAA/Aaa rating. That rating allowed participating
entities to raise funds and roll over maturing debt at significantly lower
funding costs than the entities could have obtained by issuing debt not
guaranteed by the government (see Figure 2.7). A 2017 study found
that DGP-guaranteed bonds “vastly improved new and pre-existing
debt liquidity” and that the program ultimately lowered the default risk
of the institution (as well as of the insured bond) and, in addition,
improved the liquidity for non-guaranteed bonds issued by DGP
participants.46 A 2013 study found that the DGP led to a drop in yield of
AAA/Aaa financial debt near the time of the announcements of FDICguaranteed debt issuance and to a general pattern of decreasing yield
spreads over time.47
Figure 2.8. TLGP vs. Non-TLGP Debt Issuance, October 2008–October
2009

Source: FDIC

See Jeffrey Black et al., “Benefits of Debt Guarantees: Evidence from the FDIC DebtGuarantee
Program”
(unpublished
manuscript),
February
2017,
https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.
cgi?db_name=SWFA2017&paper_id=151.
46

See Brent Ambrose et al., “The Financial Crisis and Temporary Liquidity Guarantee
Program: Their Impact on Fixed Income Markets,” Journal of Fixed Income 23, no. 2
(2013): 5–26.
47
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In the wake of the DGP, debt markets stabilized. By September 2009,
most banks were trading in the CDS market below where they were
before the Lehman bankruptcy, and a senior syndicate banker
remarked, “Good progress has been made so it makes sense for the
TLGP to be withdrawn.”48 Indeed, only a few entities had issued DGP
debt during the period of the DGP’s extension, a period when banks and
their holding companies successfully issued non-guaranteed debt (see
Figure 2.8).
Another source of funding for banks, and in particular for community
banks, is deposits held in transaction accounts. By removing the risk of
loss to the businesses that commonly use these accounts to meet
payroll and to serve other purposes, the TAGP stabilized deposit
funding for insured banks.49 In the first quarter of 2009, banks reported
586,519 non-interest-bearing transaction accounts over $250,000 in
value, representing an increase of 12 percent compared with the fourth
quarter of 2008. These first-quarter 2009 deposit accounts totaled
$855 billion, of which $700 billion was guaranteed under the TAGP. At
the peak of the program, in December 2009, more than 5,800 FDICinsured institutions reported having 685,465 non-interest-bearing
transaction accounts over $250,000 in value, with deposits totaling just
over $1 trillion.
***
If assessments for the TLGP (counting both components) had proved
insufficient to cover the expenses related to the program, statute would
have required that the FDIC levy a special assessment on all insured
depository institutions (including those that had opted out, but not
including BHCs or nonbank institutions that had participated) to cover
the loss.50 However, overall, TLGP fees exceeded the costs of the
program.
Under the DGP, 121 entities issued guaranteed debt, with the FDIC
collecting $10.4 billion in fees and surcharges. Six entities defaulted on
Euroweek, “FDIC Plans Phase Out of Guarantee Programme,” September 11, 2009,
12.
49 The TAGP also had an effect on FDIC resolutions during the crisis. In combination
with the increased insurance coverage limit to $250,000, the TAGP greatly reduced
the number of uninsured depositors at many failing banks. This reduction meant that
there were many more whole bank–all deposit resolutions, as opposed to whole
bank–insured deposit resolutions; the relative increase in whole bank–all deposit
resolutions could have reduced the FDIC’s administrative costs. For a discussion of
the different types of resolutions, see FDIC 2017, Chapter 6.
48

50

12 U.S.C. §1823(c)(4)(G)(ii).
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their debt, with the FDIC paying $153 million to cover the guarantee on
those debt securities.51 The majority of the FDIC’s payments ($113
million) stemmed from the outstanding DGP debt held by banks that
failed in 2011. Under the TAGP, the FDIC collected $1.2 billion in fees;
as of December 31, 2016, estimated TAGP losses from failures were
about $1.5 billion.52 The five failures with the highest resolution costs
attributable to the TAGP, and the relationship between those costs and
all other resolution costs attributable to the TAGP, are presented in
Figure 2.9.
Figure 2.9. The Costs of the TAGP: The 5 Most Expensive Failures vs. All
Others ($ Millions, as of December 31, 2016)

Source: FDIC

One of these losses involved fraud. Three employees of Coastal Community
Investments (Coastal), a holding company that owned two Florida banks that would
fail in 2010, were sentenced in 2014 to prison terms and were required to pay more
than $4.5 million in restitution to the FDIC. Coastal had had a $3 million secured loan
that was in default, and failure to repay the loan could have allowed its lender to take
over the two Florida banks. In order to repay the loan and retain control of the banks,
the employees misrepresented the loan as unsecured, allowing Coastal to borrow
125% of the $3 million amount and have it guaranteed under the DGP. Coastal then
obtained a DGP-guaranteed $3.75 million loan from another bank. When Coastal later
defaulted on this second loan, that lender filed a claim with the FDIC for the loan
amount plus interest, and the FDIC paid the claim of just over $3.8 million. See U.S.
Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Florida,
“Bankers and Attorney Sentenced to Prison, for Fraud, False Statement, and Making a
False Claim against the United States,” Press Release (August 22, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndfl/pr/bankers-and-attorney-sentenced-prisonfraud-false-statements-and-making-false-claim.
51

Because these totals were generated using estimated losses on failures as of
December 31, 2016, they differ from totals reported by the FDIC at the end of the
TAGP (December 31, 2010).
52
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Conclusion
For the FDIC, the TLGP was extraordinary in several ways. First, during
the Corporation’s first 75 years, it had never systematically protected
bank debt, let alone bank holding company debt or the debt of nonbank
holding company affiliates.53 Second, the FDIC had never extended
unlimited deposit insurance protection to a class of bank deposits (in
this case, a broad subset of transaction accounts), although in the past
the principle of unlimited deposit insurance coverage had been
considered. Third, this was only the second time that the FDIC’s Board
approved a systemic risk exception and the first time that the
assistance was actually put in place (assistance to Wachovia had been
approved two weeks earlier, but the need for it was subsequently
obviated when Wells Fargo acquired that bank [see FDCI 2017, Chapter
3]). Fourth, creation of the TLGP involved the use by bank regulators of
a legal interpretation of the systemic risk exception that was at the least
novel, as was acknowledged at the time. All these extraordinary
features reflected the precarious state of the financial services industry
in the fall of 2008.
The TLGP, in concert with other government programs, brought
stability to U.S. financial markets in a time of crisis. Conditions in the
credit markets had improved significantly by the start of 2009, and by
midyear they began returning to normal, despite still-elevated levels of
problem loans; interest-rate spreads had retreated from the highs
established during the depth of the crisis, during the fall of 2008; and
activity in interbank lending and corporate bond markets had
increased. Banks were able to issue debt without a government
guarantee. This stabilization of the markets was accomplished with an
industry-funded program that not only did not damage the DIF but,
instead, substantially benefited it. Overall, during a period when the
banking industry and the financial markets were in crisis, the TLGP
made an important contribution to the stability of both. Looking back
on the program, former chairman Sheila Bair noted that “if we ever
again get into a situation where the entire financial system is seizing
During the 1980s, the FDIC, in the context of resolving troubled institutions, did
protect debtholders several times. In 1984, open-bank assistance to Continental
Illinois National Bank and Trust Company included the protection of all general
creditors; the open-bank assistance to First Republic Bank Corporation in 1988 also
protected all general creditors. Some bondholders were partially protected in the
open-bank assistance to First City Bancorporation of Texas in 1988, and a year later,
with the failure of MCorp, unsubordinated general creditors of 19 of the holding
company’s banks were protected. See FDIC, Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC
Experience (1998), 554, 571, 595, 622.
53
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up, where even healthy and well-managed banks are having trouble
accessing liquidity, I do think this is a good model to use.”54
In several important ways, Dodd-Frank refined the range of actions
that would be available for responding to future crises of the financial
system, and did so essentially by limiting regulatory discretion should
another crisis arise.55 In particular, the act repealed the use of a
systemic risk exception to assist a troubled open individual institution;
and although Title XI does permit the creation of a program similar to
the DGP, it also imposes restrictions on such a program.56 Dodd-Frank
prohibits the creation of a future TAGP.57
Title XI explicitly authorizes a “liquidity event determination.”58 The
process of determining the existence of a liquidity event is similar to
the process set forth in FDICIA for declaring a systemic risk exception:
if the FDIC Board and the FRB determine that a liquidity event exists
and that failure to act would significantly affect financial stability, and
if the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the President
concurs, the FDIC has the authority to create “a widely available
program” to guarantee obligations of solvent insured banks or their
holding companies (including holding company affiliates).
But although the FDIC will be responsible for administering such a
program, the maximum amount of outstanding debt that can be
guaranteed is to be determined not by the FDIC but by the Secretary of
the Treasury in consultation with the President. And, in a significant
Joe Adler, “FDIC Debt Program Proves as Good as TARP, without the Baggage,”
American Banker, April 26, 2012.
55 See Martin Neil Baily and Aaron Klein, “The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on
Financial Stability and Economic Growth,” Presentation at University of Michigan
Center
on
Finance,
Law,
and
Policy,
October
24,
2014,
https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-impact-of-the-dodd-frank-act-onfinancial-stability-and-economic-growth/; and James Broughel, “Title XI: Fed
Transparency and Bailouts,” in Dodd-Frank: What It Does and Why It’s Flawed, ed.
Hester Peirce and James Broughel (2012), 121–35, https://www.
mercatus.org/system/files/dodd-frank-FINAL.pdf.
56 For the limits on the use of the systemic risk exception, see Dodd-Frank, §1106 [12
U.S.C 1823(c)(4)(G)(i)]; for the provisions allowing for a future DGP, see Dodd-Frank
§1104–5 [12 U.S.C. 5611–12].
57 The law states that “a guarantee of deposits held by insured depository institutions
shall not be treated as a debt guarantee program” under the provisions of the liquidity
event determination (defined in note 58). See 12 U.S.C. 5612(f).
58 The law defines a liquidity event as “an exceptional and broad reduction in the
general ability of financial market participants … to sell financial assets without an
unusual and significant discount or to borrow using financial assets as collateral
without an unusual and significant increase in margin, or an unusual and significant
reduction in the ability of financial market participants to obtain unsecured credit.”
54
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addition, the law also requires the program to have congressional
approval in the form of a joint resolution—a requirement that
essentially means Congress must pass the equivalent of a law before
the program can go forward.59 So although Dodd-Frank provides for a
program similar to the DGP, the law’s requirement for wider political
consent through congressional approval (even though the approval
would have to be considered on an expedited basis) could limit
regulators’ flexibility during a future financial crisis.

59 Like a

bill, a joint resolution requires the approval of both the House and the Senate
in identical form, and requires the President’s signature to become law
(https://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/ leg_laws_acts.htm).
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Appendix
Table 2.A. Issuers of $250 Million or More in FDIC-Guaranteed Debt
Entity
1

Citigroup, Inc.

Breakdown by Affiliate
(if applicable)
TOTAL

$175,903,888,595

Citigroup, Inc.

2

3

4

5

6
7

General Electric
Capital
Corporation
Bank of America
Corporation

JPMorgan Chase
& Co.

Goldman Sachs
Group,
Inc.
Morgan Stanley
Wells Fargo &
Company

Amount

Issuances
1,655

$13,850,000,000

5

Citigroup Funding Inc.

$128,997,377,222

1,165

Citibank, National Association
TOTAL

$33,056,511,373
$130,850,166,935

485
4,328

TOTAL

$130,842,662,031

1,454

Bank of America Corporation

$64,079,465,128

1,091

Bank of America, National Association

$46,976,837,903

281

Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
TOTAL

$19,786,359,000
$42,512,382,326

82
189

JPMorgan Chase & Co.
JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Association
TOTAL

$40,534,011,955

61

$1,978,370,371

128

$37,652,426,455

346

TOTAL

$30,256,932,941

57

TOTAL

$10,022,320,776

107

Wells Fargo & Company
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association
Wachovia Bank, National Association

$9,500,000,000

4

$250,868,606

14

$271,452,170

89

8

GMAC LLC

TOTAL

$7,400,000,000

3

9

U.S. Bancorp

TOTAL

$7,283,744,203

581

U.S. Bank National Association

$4,282,285,453

467

U.S. Bancorp
TOTAL

$3,001,458,750
$5,900,000,000

114
3

TOTAL

$5,289,431,500

53

State Street Corporation
State Street Bank and Trust Company
TOTAL

$2,839,431,500
$2,450,000,000
$4,913,503,000

51
2
116

$4,742,598,079

24

$4,616,910,000
$125,688,079

17
7

$4,200,000,000

6

10 American Express
Bank, FSB.
11 State Street
Corporation

12 John Deere Capital
Corporation
13 HSBC USA Inc.
TOTAL
(subsidiary of HSBC HSBC USA Inc.
Holdings, PLC)
HSBC Bank USA, National Association
14 Regions Bank

TOTAL

continued
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Entity

Vol. 1 Iss. 2

Breakdown by
Affiliate (if
applicable)

Amount

Issuances

15 PNC Funding Corp.

TOTAL

$3,900,000,000

4

16 SunTrust Banks, Inc.

TOTAL

$3,576,000,000

3

SunTrust Bank

$3,000,000,000

2

$576,000,000

1

17 Union Bank, National TOTAL
Association

$2,210,000,000

13

18 KeyCorp

TOTAL

$1,937,500,000

4

KeyBank National Association

$1,000,000,000

1

KeyCorp

$937,500,000

3

TOTAL

$1,600,000,000

2

Sovereign Bank

$1,350,000,000

1

SunTrust Banks, Inc.

19 Sovereign
Bancorp, Inc.

Sovereign Bancorp, Inc.
20 The Bank of New York TOTAL
Mellon Corporation The Bank of New York Mellon
Corporation
The Bank of New York Mellon
21 Bank of the West

TOTAL

22 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya TOTAL
Argentaria Puerto
Rico
23 New York
TOTAL
Community
Bancorp, Inc.
New York Community Bank
New York Community Bancorp, Inc.

$250,000,000

1

$1,040,412,845

73

$603,448,298

2

$436,964,547

71

$1,002,889,124

2

$686,440,926

31

$602,000,000

2

$512,000,000

1

$90,000,000

1

24 The Huntington
National Bank

TOTAL

$600,000,000

1

25 Wilmington Trust
Company

TOTAL

$460,000,000

11

26 MetLife, Inc.

TOTAL

$397,436,000

1

27 Associated Bank,
TOTAL
National Association

$395,000,000

6

28 Fifth Third Bancorp

TOTAL

$285,500,000

4

Fifth Third Bank

$285,000,000

3

$500,000

1

$254,892,500

1

Fifth Third Bancorp
29 Zions Bancorporation TOTAL

Note: The data presented in this table account for 99.7 percent of the debt issued under the DGP. Data on
the remaining issuers can be found at
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/total_debt.html.
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